Romania has made significant progress in the process of aligning with the standards of developed economies and joining the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), having already obtained 24 of the 25 formal opinions required within the OECD committees. The completion of the accession process, possible by the end of 2026, would represent one of the most important institutional milestones in the 36 years of post-communist economic integration. The process we are going through is, moreover, the most rigorous in the history of the OECD – involving the assessment within 25 committees, compared to only three in the case of the states that joined in the 1990s – which guarantees that the reforms are deep, sustainable, and legally anchored. The National Bank of Romania has been actively involved in this strategic approach, contributing, within its areas of competence, to the efforts to align with the standards and good practices promoted by the OECD.
The preparation effort for OECD accession reflects the transition from the status of an emerging market to that of a strategic partner for companies and investors operating in the global economy. This path provides Romania with the necessary tools to overcome the “middle income trap” and maintain the path of economic development. By joining the OECD, our country consolidates a set of rules that protect property and stimulate innovation, transforming economic growth from a cyclical phenomenon into a sustainable structural process.
From formal compliance to structural transformation
The essential benefit is not simply belonging to a select club, but the internalization of mechanisms and good practices, which result in the reduction of country risk and, implicitly, the cost of capital. The experience of the Czech Republic and Poland confirms this phenomenon – after joining the OECD, both states recorded a constant decrease in risk premiums, facilitating financing at lower costs (both for the state and the private sector – companies and the population), comparable to those borne by mature economies. Similarly, alignment with international standards of governance, transparency, and prudence reclassifies Romanian assets into more favorable investment categories, making them more attractive to large global investors and ensuring long-term capital flows, vital for the entire economy and for the large infrastructure and energy projects that we urgently need.
OECD integration acts as a catalyst for productivity, imposing rigorous standards of corporate governance and transparency in the public sector. For investors in developed economies, these reforms are not just formal requirements, but guarantees of a predictable business environment, which reduces transaction costs and operational risk. Structural alignment paves the way for the nominal convergence criteria, demonstrating that the Romanian economy can function efficiently under the competitive pressure of the single market, without relying on external monetary adjustment mechanisms. This structural transformation is based on stimulating total factor productivity (TFP), the pillar that allows decoupling economic growth from the mere extensive consumption of resources. The professionalization of management in state-owned companies and the deep digitalization of the interface between the public and private sectors act as an invisible efficiency engine.
Slovenia is a case in point, where the adoption of OECD guidelines on corporate governance has led to an increase in value added in the state-owned enterprise sector, reducing reliance on public subsidies. These reforms go beyond technical requirements, aiming to eliminate institutional frictions that have previously hindered real convergence. By facilitating the flow of innovation and capital, Romania is making the transition from a model based on labor cost arbitrage to a competitive economy focused on knowledge and high value added.
Attracting new sources of capital and integrating into global value chains
From a capital flows perspective, OECD membership opens access to investment funds whose activity complies with strict mandates regarding country ratings and membership in multilateral organizations. This infusion of quality capital is essential for financing infrastructure and technology projects, accelerating real income convergence. Thus, the economic gap between Romania and the Eurozone average can be reduced at a sustainable pace, minimizing the asymmetric shocks that could arise in a monetary union without a sufficiently solid industrial and services base. A vital component of this new stage is attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) in high-tech sectors. OECD membership acts as a magnet for quality capital, interested in research and development as well as high-technology production projects.
The historical data is eloquent: in the case of the Czech Republic, the stock of FDI relative to GDP increased spectacularly from around 12% at the time of accession to over 70% in the following decades, a process fueled by investors’ confidence in the predictability of the OECD framework. By adopting high standards in intellectual property protection and digital governance, Romania is becoming a regulated haven for tech giants and leading industries. This infusion of expertise not only modernizes the industrial base, but also creates innovation ecosystems where domestic firms can evolve from simple suppliers to development partners, consolidating the country’s position in the upper segments of global value chains.
In fiscal terms, the adoption of OECD transfer pricing guidelines and tax dispute resolution mechanisms provides multinationals with predictability similar to that in developed Western markets. This, together with the elimination of arbitrary audit risks, strengthens Romania’s position as a secure regional business hub on NATO’s eastern flank, where OECD economic stability is intertwined with a strategic security partnership.
Social inclusion is a determinant of economic resilience
A distinctive element of this vision is the use of social inclusion as a productivity reserve. By reconnecting segments of the population outside the labor market and by streamlining investments in education and health, Romania is strengthening its internal resilience.
The Polish model has demonstrated that labor force activation policies aligned with OECD recommendations can sustain GDP per capita growth rates above the European average, even in times of external volatility. This approach transforms demographic vulnerabilities into opportunities for sustainable growth, ensuring that the prosperity generated by accession is distributed on a meritocratic basis. A fairer society is not only an ethical imperative, but also the foundation of macroeconomic stability that can absorb external shocks without destabilizing internal balances.
OECD accession is a stepping stone to relaunch the euro adoption strategy
The completion of the OECD accession process, hopefully as soon as possible, will create solid premises for the continued adjustment and consolidation of the Romanian economy, providing a more robust institutional and public policy framework. At the same time, this step must also be seen as a preparatory stage for the next major strategic objective – accession to the euro area – a project of fundamental importance, which the National Bank of Romania actively supports with full involvement, in line with its mandate and constantly taking into account the need to ensure sustainable convergence.
The transformative effects of the reforms undertaken by Romania in the process of accession to the OECD constitute a veritable launching pad for the further consolidation of the macro-financial framework in preparation for single currency adoption. The recent example of Croatia is revealing: the success of the euro changeover was paved by a rigorous process of alignment with high standards of governance and transparency, in the context of the objective of accession to the OECD, which allowed for a transition without major inflationary turbulence. An economy that already operates under the discipline of global standards is an economy that can cope with competitive pressures within the monetary union. Maintaining the pace of reform under the aegis of the OECD, even after the completion of the accession process, will function as a solid support for the strategic ambition to enter the Eurozone.
Fiscal discipline is the bridge between institutional and nominal convergence
A critical component of this path is fiscal consolidation and budgetary discipline, central pillars in the architecture of both fields. The OECD’s expertise in fiscal policy and combating tax base erosion provides Romania with the necessary tools to balance public finances. Responsible deficit management, under the supervision of this elite forum, represents the strongest signal of stability that Romania can send, attesting to the maturity necessary to join the euro club.
The challenge is to maintain the consistency of reforms in a volatile environment
However, turning this path into a historic success depends on the ability to manage the tensions inherent in deep reform processes, in an international context marked by high volatility. Beyond technical alignment with OECD standards, the great challenge lies in maintaining a strategic consistency that will cross the different political and economic cycles, avoiding the risk of treating these recommendations as purely formal objectives.
The recent economic reality highlights the importance of balanced arbitrages between the need to stimulate investment and the imperative of fiscal consolidation. In this sense, the sustainability of the path towards the Eurozone will be guaranteed not only by the adoption of rules, but by the internalization of a culture of responsibility.
Tools such as independent monitoring mechanisms for public policies, decision-making transparency and administrative digitalization thus become essential pillars. They ensure that OECD rigor is not just a transitional stage, but becomes the foundation of a resilient economy, capable of converting external pressures into opportunities for continuous modernization.
The dualism of convergence, between real progress and nominal demands
Continuing to implement OECD principles after formal accession is the guarantee that Romania targets the Eurozone as a natural destination for a mature economy. Just as Poland and the Czech Republic have used OECD membership to strengthen their competitiveness, Romania can now build its own resilience. The success of this path transforms the transition to the euro from an administrative challenge into a natural option, based on a verified institutional capacity. Through this strategic succession, Romania secures its place in the European community, converting the trust of international markets into sustainable prosperity for all its citizens.
National convergence is overshadowed by structural divergences between regions
The analysis of the path towards the single currency highlights a systematic contrast between real and nominal convergence. Romania has rapidly caught up, reaching a GDP per capita of over 78% of the EU average, a performance comparable to that of Poland. However, this dynamic masks deep territorial disparities, and a fragmented convergence creates a two-speed economy – a globally integrated, technological sector, and a subsistence sector, which risks being marginalized in a rigorous monetary union. Vast semi-rural regions remain trapped in structural underdevelopment, with limited access to basic infrastructure and competitive labor markets. In this context, the role of the authorities is that of institutional facilitator, providing the predictability and infrastructure necessary for the dynamism of the business environment to penetrate the areas left behind. These regions represent, in fact, true untapped growth reservoirs, whose revival depends on the capacity of private capital to generate value beyond the traditional urban poles. Thus, the maturity of the economy is measured also by its ability to diffuse productivity to the periphery, transforming isolated growth into solid national resilience, capable of withstanding the competitive pressures of the single market.
In a volatile global context, compliance with the Maastricht nominal criteria is no longer a simple exercise in ticking off technical norms, but a way to build macroeconomic immunity. A systematic fulfillment of the nominal standards would distance us from the temptation of pro-cyclical policies and would strengthen the purchasing power of citizens. Without this anchor of stability, the adoption of the Euro would remain a vulnerable objective, transforming the benefits of the single market into contagion risks for a structurally unprepared economy.
The final test will be the economy’s ability to perform without arbitrary anchors
The path to the single currency is not a simple exercise in compliance, but the process by which the economy builds its capacity to absorb asymmetric shocks by relying to a greater extent on real competitiveness. This structural resilience cannot be decreed administratively; it fundamentally depends on the vitality of the private sector and the confidence of investors who allocate their capital for the long term.
The success of the transition lies in the ability of companies to transform the stability offered by OECD standards into real competitive advantages, and the risk appetite of entrepreneurs and their capacity for innovation become the only guarantors for growth. By reducing institutional uncertainty, supported by rigorous fiscal discipline (for nominal stability) and massive investments in human capital and digital infrastructure (for structural robustness), Romania is preparing the ground for private investment to migrate to high added-value projects.
Ultimately, the level of readiness for Euro adoption will be validated not by official statistics, but by the density and performance of capital that chooses Romania as a hub of stability in a region marked by uncertainty.
Accession to the OECD can be seen as a stage in the process of preparing for entry into the Eurozone
In this context, Romania’s accession to the Eurozone should be seen not as an isolated project, but as a natural continuation of the institutional and economic transformations generated by the OECD process. Internalized standards of governance, transparency, and economic discipline will contribute over time to reducing structural vulnerabilities, increasing competitiveness and enhancing the capacity to adjust in response to future shocks.
What does the process of joining the euro entail?
The fundamental economic framework underlying the functioning of the euro area was formulated 40 years before the introduction of the single currency. In 1961, the Canadian economist Robert Mundell wrote A Theory of Optimum Currency Areas, which introduced the theory of optimal currency areas into the literature. For his contribution, Robert Mundell was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1999, the same year the euro was introduced as fiat currency, being used for payments between banks, financial markets, and accounting. The theory of optimal currency areas provides a fundamental benchmark for assessing the costs and benefits of monetary integration. According to this theoretical framework, the adoption of a common currency is optimal only in the presence of sufficient adjustment mechanisms, such as labor and capital mobility, fiscal transfers, or the synchronization of business cycles, which compensate for the loss of independent monetary policy and exchange rate flexibility. From this perspective, the euro area can be seen as a partial optimal monetary area, given the limited degree of fiscal integration and the persistent heterogeneity of economic structures and cyclical positions across member states.
In the 1990s, economists involved in drafting the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union analysed average levels of public debt in the member states of the European Economic Community, finding that, in most countries characterised by fiscal discipline, it was usually in the range of 50–60% of GDP. On this basis, it was assessed that an economy with a public debt level of around 60% of GDP and a budget deficit of no more than 3% of GDP could maintain its debt stable in the medium term, given nominal growth of around 5% per year. In other words, a nominal growth rate of 5% can be interpreted as resulting from real economic growth of around 3%, combined with inflation of 2%.
It is very important that these criteria are met sustainably, not episodically, i.e. that they can be maintained after accession when new shocks may arise and the economy will no longer have the same adjustment levers. The fulfillment of this important conditionality is supported by the existence of broad and deep real convergence.
The experience of the exchange rate arrangements within the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) since the early 1990s provides a relevant illustration of the limitations of monetary integration in the absence of conditions close to those of an optimal currency area. The crisis episode of 1992, culminating in the exit of Great Britain from the ERM, highlights the difficulties of maintaining a fixed exchange rate regime in the face of unsynchronized business cycles and macroeconomic fundamentals diverging from those of the reference economy, in this case Germany. The need to align monetary policy with conditions in the dominant economy has generated significant costs for economies in recession, amplifying macroeconomic tensions and financial vulnerabilities. From this perspective, the ERM experience confirms the theoretical intuitions of Robert Mundell (1961), according to which the absence of alternative adjustment mechanisms can transform fixed exchange rate regimes into a source of instability. Moreover, this episode highlights the importance of the interaction between monetary policy constraints and financial conditions, an aspect particularly relevant for small and open economies, where exchange rate rigidity can amplify imbalances and generate significant macroeconomic costs.
Compared to the ERM, the ERM II introduced a more flexible arrangement, based on the anchoring of currencies to the euro and wider fluctuation bands, and was designed as a transitional mechanism towards the adoption of the single currency, avoiding the rigidities and vulnerabilities of the previous system.
An intermediate step in the accession process is participation in the ERM II mechanism, considered a preparatory stage before the adoption of the single currency. Within this mechanism, which functions as an antechamber for accession to the Economic and Monetary Union, the monetary authority largely loses its ability to use the exchange rate as an adjustment tool. As a result, monetary policy can no longer function as the main macroeconomic stabilization tool for correcting imbalances. In practice, the ERM II tests the economy’s ability to cope with shocks without resorting to exchange rate adjustments, thus ensuring coherent integration into the monetary union.
It is also relevant that the Maastricht Treaty does not provide mechanisms for exiting the Economic and Monetary Union. Under these conditions, after joining the European Union, economies such as Romania, which are in an emerging stage of development, have sought to approach the standards of the euro area, both in nominal and real terms.
The institutional transformations associated with this process have also generated additional challenges, in the absence of previous experience in managing them. A relevant example is the impact of the complete liberalization of the capital account and its operating mechanisms.
Lessons from the past: the exchange rate as an adjustment mechanism
The sharp and long-lasting depreciation of the leu between 1989 and 2003 was determined both by the economic difficulties specific to the beginning of the transition to a market economy and by the negative impact it generated on the emerging business environment and, in particular, on the population.
The first decade of the transition was characterized by profound instability and extensive structural transformations, within the framework of a complex process of post-communist economic reform. This included massive industrial restructuring, difficult privatizations and the development of a still fragile financial sector. At the same time, inflation was at high levels and the population’s confidence in the newly created institutions, in the functioning of the economy and in the financial system was limited, which generated persistent pressures on the exchange rate.
From a social point of view, this period was marked by uncertainty and increasing tensions. The implementation of structural reforms was accompanied by significant costs, such as significant job losses, reduced purchasing power and increased migration. These developments contributed to the decline in confidence in the economic outlook and encouraged the population to shift towards foreign exchange, to the detriment of the national currency.
At the same time, the international financial environment was affected by episodes of instability, including the Asian crisis of 1997 and the Russian crisis of 1998, which amplified the internal vulnerabilities of the Romanian economy. These external shocks favored capital outflows, increased the costs of external financing and accentuated depreciation pressures on the leu.
An important moment was represented by the official opening of the accession negotiations to the European Union, on 14 February 2000, at the Intergovernmental Conference in Brussels. At this stage, the reforms necessary for alignment with the acquis communautaire were initiated and the preparation of the negotiation chapters began. During the period 2000–2003, the economy gradually entered a stabilization process, supported by more coherent monetary and fiscal policies, the resumption of economic growth and the reduction of inflation. Fiscal consolidation (the budget deficit falling below 1% of GDP in 2005, according to Eurostat), the relaunch of structural reforms and the substantial inflows of foreign capital, including direct investments, contributed to increasing confidence in the national currency. These factors largely explain the relatively sustained appreciation of the leu during the period 2004–2007. This development was supported by clear prospects for European integration, improving sovereign ratings and significant capital inflows, particularly to the banking and real estate sectors. In addition, gradual capital account liberalization stimulated inflows from investors attracted by still high yields and the potential for economic convergence.
This appreciation trend was interrupted in the second half of 2007, with the outbreak of the global financial crisis, which represented a major external shock for the Romanian economy, already integrated into international financial and trade flows. In this context, the decline in confidence in emerging markets and international turbulence generated significant capital outflows. Over the next two years or so, the exchange rate again experienced episodes of sharp depreciation, in a volatility pattern comparable, in some respects, to that of the period before 2000.
It was only starting in 2009, against the background of the first signs of correction of the fiscal and external imbalances accumulated during the crisis, that the exchange rate entered a more stable regime. Fluctuations became more moderate and easier to absorb by the economy and the population, without generating significant distortions or major dysfunctions in the mechanisms of the market economy.
The real convergence process in the case of Romania
Beyond the nominal requirements, the adoption of the single currency also presupposes the existence of a solid process of real convergence. Looking back at the period since accession to the European Union until now, the indicators reveal significant progress towards real convergence. GDP per capita, calculated at purchasing power parity (PPP), rose from around 10,800 euros in 2007 to almost 31,000 euros in 2024, which means an increase of approximately three times in 17 years. The choice of this indicator expressed in PPS is justified by the fact that it more adequately captures the effective purchasing power of the population, allowing for relevant comparisons between the Member States of the European Union, regardless of differences in price levels and the cost of living.
During the same period, the average GDP per capita at the European Union level increased from 24,700 euros to 39,700 euros. Consequently, Romania recorded a convergence rate higher than the European average, evolving from approximately 44% of the EU average in 2007 to approximately 79% in 2024, which, however, places it only in 18th position out of the 27 Member States. At the same time, developments after the financial crisis have highlighted the importance of economic growth based on sustainable foundations. For Romania and other similar economies in Central and Eastern Europe, this aspect gains increased relevance in the context of the objective of joining the euro area.
Structural constraints on convergence: the Balassa–Samuelson effect
The Balassa–Samuelson effect influences the way in which the convergence process manifests itself in emerging economies, such as Romania or other Central and Eastern European states within the European Union. According to the mechanism described by Balassa–Samuelson, emerging economies generally experience faster rates of productivity growth in the tradable sector compared to developed economies. Under these conditions, the theory suggests the following implications:
- i) more developed countries tend to have higher levels of productivity in the tradable goods sector;
- ii) the real exchange rate is usually more appreciated in rich economies;
iii) the general price level is higher in these economies;
- iv) emerging economies typically experience higher inflation rates than advanced ones;
- v) prices of services are generally lower in less developed countries.
Even if some euro area economies, such as Greece or Portugal, had a considerably higher level of development compared to the countries of the last wave of accession, including Romania, this does not guarantee the achievement of the maximum development potential. At the same time, if the potential level of an economy is lower than that of advanced economies, it is unrealistic to expect a complete convergence towards these standards. Moreover, in the case of emerging economies, the favourable developments reflect both the general growth trends at European level and the catching-up effects, together with the influence of factors specific to each economy or stage of development.
The perspective of the Central and Eastern European states
The decision to adopt the euro is not determined exclusively by the fulfillment of economic criteria, but also reflects political and strategic choices. The cases of the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary are illustrative in this regard. Although these economies have achieved, at various times in the past, degrees of nominal and real convergence comparable or even superior to Romania, they have chosen not to accelerate the accession process. The motivation is not related to economic incapacity, but to the preference for maintaining the autonomy of monetary policy and the exchange rate, instruments considered useful for managing economic cycles and supporting more flexible growth models. It is therefore beyond any doubt that joining the euro area is a decision that reflects a certain vision of economic sovereignty, the role of the state and the positioning within the European project.
This reality suggests that the accession process must be understood as a dual one: technical and political. From a technical perspective, the Maastricht criteria establish a clear set of quantifiable conditions. From a political perspective, however, accession implies the assumption of permanent discipline and irreversible integration into the economic and decision-making mechanisms of the Eurozone. Therefore, the moment of accession is determined not only by the degree of readiness of the economy, but also by the willingness and commitment of the political class to definitively abandon some adjustment instruments and to permanently adopt a more restrictive conduct.
The positive experiences of Croatia and (more recently) Bulgaria provide useful current benchmarks for assessing the benefits. Croatia is an example of the effective use of the euro accession objective as an anchor for economic policy. The necessary macroeconomic adjustments — in particular, in terms of fiscal and external stability — were made gradually and consistently. The result was increased credibility, a spectacular improvement in the sovereign rating (from sub-investment grade to A), a decrease in the cost of financing, the elimination of currency risk, higher foreign investment, growing business for local companies and greater well-being for the population. The goal of adopting the euro functioned as a mechanism for disciplining public policies and coordinating expectations, reducing uncertainty and facilitating an orderly transition without major episodes of instability.
Croatia’s macroeconomic adjustment process for euro adoption has gone through several stages. The first, between 2014 and 2016, was marked by relatively large fiscal consolidation, while the country was under the European Commission’s Excessive Deficit Procedure. During this time, the government deficit decreased from 5.5% of GDP to below one percent. The second stage began in 2017, when the Croatian government included euro accession in its government program and subsequently, together with the Croatian National Bank, published the Euro Adoption Strategy. The transition to the third stage, essential from an institutional perspective, was made in July 2019, by sending the letter of intent to the ECB, signed by the Minister of Finance and the Governor of the central bank. The effective entry into ERM II took place in July 2020, fixing the kuna/euro exchange rate at 7.53450 and triggering the mandatory two-year exchange rate stability period. Finally, on 1 January 2023, Croatia became the twentieth member of the euro area. Anchoring in the euro area accession process has significantly contributed to the orientation of reforms and the strengthening of economic policy discipline, allowing Croatia to achieve consistent macroeconomic adjustments: public debt decreased in ten years from 83.2% of GDP to 57.4% of GDP in 2024; at the end of the same year, the government deficit was 1.9% of GDP; The current account balance fluctuated in 2023-2024 between a slight surplus and a deficit of about 2.2% of GDP, and economic growth remained above 3% (supported, in particular, by the HORECA and IT&C sectors).
The case of Bulgaria, although more recent, points to another relevant dynamic. Even though the level of structural readiness was perceived as lower compared to other countries, accession was followed by a positive revaluation of financial and real assets. The first signals from the market – including the evolution of stock market indices after 1 January 2026 – suggest an increase in investor confidence and a reduction in the risk premium, also with direct positive effects on wealth and welfare. This mechanism, by which monetary integration leads to a recalibration of the perception of country risk, is well documented and has been observed in other episodes of euro area enlargement.
The examples of CEE countries mentioned above therefore highlight two types of strategic policy options: either strategic prudence (in which accession is postponed in order to preserve the flexibility of economic policies) or accelerated integration (in which the objective of accession is used as an instrument to discipline and accelerate reforms). Choosing one of the two models is not only a purely technical decision, but also represents a political option and strategic positioning within the European Union.
Euro accession: between strategic opportunity and macroeconomic constraint. Perspectives on the accession process
In this context, the economies of the region faced the dilemma of accelerating or postponing the fulfilment of the convergence criteria necessary for the adoption of the euro. Both options entail advantages and costs. Postponing accession provides additional time for the implementation of structural reforms, strengthening convergence and maintaining control over monetary policy and the exchange rate, while contributing to better economic synchronization. In return, this strategy entails maintaining currency risk, possible delays in reforms, relaxation of macroeconomic discipline and a possible decrease in international investor confidence.
Greece’s option to adopt the single currency in that context was justified by the immediate advantages associated with a rapid integration into the Economic and Monetary Union. The assessment of the cost-benefit ratio depends, essentially, on the fact that accession to the euro area implies the loss of monetary policy autonomy, an essential instrument of macroeconomic stabilization, especially in the case of emerging economies, depending on the degree of synchronization between them and the rest of the union.
The literature emphasizes the importance of synchronizing economic cycles and the structure of economies, often considered an essential condition for the coherent functioning of the monetary union. Developments after the sovereign debt crisis in the euro area, especially those associated with economies such as Greece, Portugal or Cyprus, have brought this issue back to the fore. If before 2008 these discussions were more of a theoretical nature, linked to the risks of an insufficiently prepared integration, the economic and financial crisis transformed them into a concrete economic policy issue. In this context, the authorities were forced to adopt policy combinations aimed at restoring macroeconomic balances, the example of Greece being relevant. Consequently, the correlation of economic cycles with those of the main trading partners becomes an important condition for maintaining macroeconomic stability.
Conclusions: adopting the euro is a strategic objective correlated with Romania’s path of economic integration and institutional maturation
The revitalization of Romania’s objective and strategy for joining the Eurozone can function as a credible anchor for maintaining a coherent macroeconomic adjustment trajectory. In a context characterized by numerous constraints and high volatility, the objective of adopting the single currency reduces the risk of economic policy slippages and supports the continuity of reforms. More than a simple formal target, this objective can structure a clear roadmap for consolidating internal and external balances, favoring sustainable convergence.
An essential effect of this process is the anchoring of investors’ expectations. The credible commitment to monetary integration sends the signal that Romania assumes a predictable path, based on stability and economic discipline. This is also the reason why in most meetings with foreign institutional investors in recent years, they have asked about the status of the euro adoption project, about the political and institutional commitments in relation to it, and about the target deadline. Therefore, revitalizing this objective would have favorable effects from the perspective of foreign capital flows.
In terms of financial conditions, joining the Eurozone is structurally associated with a reduction in financing costs. The elimination of currency risk and the compression of risk premiums typically lead to lower interest rates, both for the public and private sectors. For companies, this translates into easier and cheaper access to financing for investments, and for the population, into more favorable lending conditions and, implicitly, an increase in welfare. This cheaper capital is not just a short-term benefit, but reflects integration into a financial space characterized by stability and high liquidity. In parallel, the improvement in investor perception leads to a favorable revaluation of financial and real assets — from stocks and bonds to real estate assets — reflecting integration into a more stable and predictable economic space.
At the same time, the adoption of the single currency facilitates a deeper integration of the Romanian financial and banking system into the European architecture. Full participation in the mechanisms of the Economic and Monetary Union — including the Banking Union — strengthens the resilience of the financial sector and increases the efficiency of capital allocation.
It is important to bear in mind that adopting the euro is a strategic and political choice, not just an economic one, because if it had only been necessary to meet the strictly economic criteria, then, for example, the Czech Republic and Poland would already be in the Eurozone. However, they (although having a higher GDP per capita than the others in the CEE area) prefer to preserve their monetary autonomy, aiming to maintain the lever of exchange rate flexibility to respond to economic shocks, because their own currency is seen as a central instrument of economic policy and an element of sovereignty.
For smaller countries, however, such as the Baltic countries, Slovakia, Slovenia, Croatia, and Bulgaria, the transition to the euro is seen as the successful completion of the economic integration process and, at the same time, as a political and geostrategic guarantee. Smaller states choose the euro more easily because they seek the elimination of currency risk, lower financing costs, and deeper integration into global trade flows. In the case of the Baltic countries, an equally important motivation was the firm anchoring in Western democratic society, a choice also influenced by the historical context that led to the decision to definitively exit Russia’s sphere of influence.
It is therefore obvious that, beyond the economic criteria, which are mandatory, there are a number of other important factors that influence the decision to adopt the euro. In particular, the success of such a project is conditional on the existence of a sufficiently broad and stable political consensus at the national level. European experience shows that, in the absence of cross-party support, the process becomes vulnerable to changes of government, electoral cycles, and ideological repositioning in domestic politics, which can lead either to repeated postponements or to institutional blockages. In the case of some Central European economies, such as the Czech Republic or Poland, remaining outside the euro area for the time being does not reflect exclusively economic constraints, but above all the absence of a lasting political agreement on the opportunity and timing of accession. This is mainly determined by the reluctance to give up important economic policy instruments of the state, such as monetary policy and the exchange rate, which can facilitate adjustments and alleviate, at least temporarily, the burden on the economic environment and the population in the event of large-scale external shocks.
On the other hand, recent examples suggest that where there is a sufficiently coherent political majority, the process can advance substantially. In Croatia, the adoption of the euro was supported by a clear and continuous institutional commitment, reflected also in the phased path (macroeconomic adjustment, entry into ERM II, assumption of the Banking Union), which allowed the strategic direction to be maintained regardless of the cyclical fluctuations.
In the case of Romania, a project of such a nature cannot be imagined without broad political support from the parties that have a large majority in Parliament, because it implies a succession of commitments that go beyond the horizon of an electoral cycle: fiscal consolidation, maintaining macroeconomic stability, structural reforms, and participation in the European mechanisms preceding the adoption of the euro. Political consensus would reduce the risk of a return to pro-cyclical policies or fiscal relaxation, which would cancel the convergence gains achieved during the adjustment period. In this sense, political support is not only a condition of opportunity, but also of credibility. It helps to anchor expectations, reduce the perception of risk, and transform the objective of adopting the euro from a declarative aspiration into an effective commitment. Without it, even significant economic progress may remain insufficient to trigger or sustain the process of monetary integration.
Adopting the euro could therefore be an important option in the process of economic maturation, which requires broad political support in the long term. If it were to be achieved, it would provide Romania with stability, supporting the continuation of convergence and consolidating the progress achieved so far into a sustainable gain.
In my view, the euro is not just a currency; it is the economic expression of a strategic membership. For Romania, its adoption would mark the transition from the status of an economy striving to maintain convergence to that of a full participant in the decision-making mechanisms of the European economic architecture.